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Abstract
In this article we describe an approach to autonomous system construction that not only supports self-
awareness but also formal verification. This is based on modular construction where the key autonomous
decision-making is captured within a symbolically described ‘agent’. So this article lead us from traditional
systems architectures, via agent-based computing, to explainability, reconfigurability, and verifiability, and
on to applications in robotics, autonomous vehicles, and machine ethics.
Fundamentally, we consider self-awareness from an agent-based perspective. Agents are an important
abstraction capturing autonomy and we are particularly concerned with Intentional, or Rational, Agents
that expose the ‘intentions’ of the autonomous system. Beyond being a useful abstract concept, agents
also provide a practical engineering approach for building the core software in autonomous systems
such as robots and vehicles. In a modular autonomous system architecture, agents of this form capture
important decision-making elements. Furthermore, this ability to transparently capture such decision-
making processes, and especially being able to expose their intentions, within an agent allows us to apply
strong (formal) agent verification techniques to these systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
Autonomous Systems, ranging from robots, unmanned vehicles, ‘smart’ technologies, and on to au-
tonomous software, are increasingly popular. For example:
• “driverless cars” are being developed and even deployed on standard highways [1], for example
Figure 1a;
• robots are being developed for domestic duties, not just robotic vacuum cleaners [2] (Figure 1b) but
more complex robotic assistants [3], [4] (Figure 1c);
• unmanned air systems, or ‘drones’, are available with varying degrees of autonomous capability not
just to large organisations and the military, but to the public (Figure 1d);
• autonomic systems [5], combining autonomy and self-awareness in networks/communications struc-
tures are common; and
• high-frequency or automated trading systems are available for markets with online access [6], again
with varying degrees of autonomy.
There are many more examples, across industrial, financial, health-care, and domestic sectors. Yet most of
these, particularly in safety-critical areas, remain essentially human-controlled: the responsibility for safety
in a “driverless car” remains with the driver; the responsibility for safety in a remote-controlled ‘drone’
remains with the remote operator; and so on. Current regulations limit the amount of true autonomy
that such systems can exhibit. For example, for air vehicles in the United Kingdom there are strict
regulations [7] ensuring that drones of over 250g weight must be registered and the operator of such a
drone must pass an appropriate test. Drones are also restricted in where they can fly, again often relating
to their size. Similarly, there are a range of regulations constraining the use of “driverless cars”, though
these may have local variations [8].
In what follows, we will describe how we can construct self-aware and increasingly autonomous systems.
Work on self-awareness, particularly introspection and internal models, has been around for a very long
time. Clearly Philosophy and Psychology have studied these aspects for centuries, but Logic has also
developed (led by Philosophy) to provide a range of formalisms for capturing these aspects. Once we
move on to computational systems, and in particular AI systems, then all of the above works become
even more relevant. We would argue that self-awareness is, in fact, crucial for many aspects of safety,
reliability, ethical behaviour, and ongoing verifiability. Any practical system will have a much clearer
and more accurate view of its own capabilities and issues if it is self-aware. Furthermore, there are many
aspects of verification, and particularly validation, that depend crucially on self-awareness. Providing
explanations for actions or choices, as well as diagnosing and explaining errors or issues, will be vital
to acceptability, trust, and, therefore, the widespread adoption of autonomous systems.
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Figure 1: Examples of embodied autonomous systems currently available.
It is important to note that we are considering autonomous systems here, not just individual sub-
symbolic components. An autonomous system, especially a modular one, will comprise a wide variety
of components, not only image classifiers developed using machine learning techniques, but motor
controls, sensors, planners, risk analysis modules, etc. All these components work together to create
the overall autonomous behaviour. However, within the agent-based view it is the core agent/agents
that captures/capture the essential autonomous decision-making (that used to be undertaken by humans).
When we carry out verification and validation of autonomous systems there are a wide range of techniques
used across the differing modular components. We might use physical testing for physical interactions,
approximations for adaptive learning, and even formal verification for key software components [?].
Formally verifying the decision-making agent in such architectures does not require us to enumerate
all possible environments/decisions but to verify the way decisions are made to ensure that decisions
are always taken for the right reasons. In this way we can be confident of the decision-making process
without know about every detailed situation.
In this article, we will provide an overview not only of how we can construct self-aware autonomous
systems, but how we can potentially have verifiable, self-aware behaviour. Throughout, we will provide
pointers to papers providing much greater detail, but intend to highlight the key issues developed as part
of this work. The key message here is that, by using such a modular agent-based approach, not only
increased autonomy but increased self-awareness can be made available. Our formal agent verification
techniques then allow us to precisely assess a range of key properties. We will begin, however, with a
brief description of three aspects that converge in our work: autonomy; verification; and self-awareness.
A. Automation, Adaptation, and Autonomy
While a dictionary definition of (human) autonomy involves independence, free will, and the ability to
make ones own decisions, we can take a broad definition of autonomy in computational systems as
the ability to make decisions, and potentially take actions, without direct human intervention.
While rooted in philosophical views of autonomy [9], the development of autonomous computational
systems has been taken up, expanding in the 1980s and 1990s, through Control Systems [10] and Agent-
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general definition into further sub-categories describing where, and how, decisions are mode.
Automatic systems involve a number of fixed, and prescribed, activities and, while there may be
options that can be taken, these are generally fixed in advance.
→ Such systems are typically deployed in environments that are either well-understood and tightly
defined (for example, factory automation) or where the poorly understood or undefined parts of
the environment are not important to system performance (for example, robot vacuum cleaners).
Adaptive systems typically match their activities (and performance) against a physical environment,
often combining continuous sampling and optimisation through feedback control systems.
→ Here, while the precise nature of the environment may be unknown, we have a good under-
standing of how the robot should detect changes in the environment and adapt to it in order to
achieve system performance in a reactive fashion.
Autonomous systems are neither pre-scripted nor driven exclusively by feedback control, but can
make their decisions based on a variety of dimensions including internal state and motivations.
→ These systems are intended for operating environments that might be complex and unknown,
and so may require variable performance measures or utilising a range of adaptation methods
depending upon context (and so, may themselves have to selecting new goals or modify initial
goals).
In devising a range of practical systems and in working towards strong analysis such as formal verification,
then distinguishing between these variations is often crucial in calibrating what analysis techniques should
be used and how much confidence we can place in them.
Since the key new aspect of autonomy is that the system, rather than any human user/operator/driver,
now makes decisions (and potentially takes actions), it is important to consider where those decisions
are taken. Generalising about the categories of system above we might describe how:
• in automatic systems, the decisions are essentially pre-coded by the system developer and are not
dramatically affected by developments or environments;
• in adaptive systems, the decisions are essentially made by the environment with tight feedback
control driving the system through environmental interaction; while
• in autonomous systems, decisions are taken by the system software based on internal state (such as
goals or motivations) and context, though informed by environmental interactions.
As we will see later, the varieties of verification we might use for each of these classes of system might
be quite different.
Finally in this section, we note that there is another dimension regarding autonomy that concerns the
level of human control. Many systems involve some aspect of human control, and how much of this
control there is is often captured through “levels of autonomy”. Although there are quite a number of
these different classifications, many being sector-specific, one of the earliest such taxonomies captures the
spectrum of variable autonomy. This effort, called ‘PACT’ [12], was developed for aerospace scenarios
and catalogues levels of autonomy from level 0 (direct human control) to level 5 (full autonomy), as
follows [12].
Level 0: “No Autonomy”
→ Whole task is carried out by the human except for the actual operation
Level 1: “Advice only if requested”
→ Human asks system to suggest options and then human makes selection
Level 2: “Advice”
→ System suggests options to human
Level 3: “Advice, and if authorised, action”
→ System suggests options and also proposes one of them
Level 4: “Action unless revoked”
4a: System chooses an action and performs it if the human approves
4b: System chooses an action and performs it unless the human disapproves
Level 5: “Full Autonomy”
5a: System chooses action, performs it, and informs the human
5b: System does everything autonomously
The ability to fulfill categorisations such as the above of course depends on the capabilities of the system.
A fully autonomous system might be able to move between the above levels, whereas an adaptive or
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aspect of this concerns the mechanism by which a system changes between these levels. Not only when
can the operator/pilot/driver give the system more control, but when can the system relinquish some/all
control back to the human? Work on such variable, shared or adjustable autonomy remains of strong
relevance to practical systems [13]–[15].
B. Verification
The term Verification covers a range of techniques that aim to assess whether (and how well) a system
meets its requirements. A particular subset, termed Formal Verification, carries out the analysis of precise,
formal requirements, with this analysis comprising strong mathematical/logical techniques such as formal
proof. This leads us to be able, in some cases, to prove that a system meets its requirements. Within
the umbrella term “formal verification”, there are many different techniques. One particularly popular
technique is model checking [16], [17], where the formally defined requirements are automatically checked
against all possible executions of the system, as captured within a mathematical model. Model-checking
is the variety of formal verification most widely used for safety critical systems, though its use for
autonomous (robotic) systems is relatively recent [18].
As we will see later, we employ a variety of model-checking to formally verify the behaviour of our
practical autonomous systems. In capturing the system’s core autonomous behaviour as a rational agent,
we allow formal agent model-checking techniques to be used as a route to the verification of autonomous
behaviour [19]. As we will see in Section IV, the verification of autonomy should take into account not
only what the agent does, but why it chooses to do it.
Since autonomous systems typically interact with a complex external environment, we must ensure that
verification is extended to take this aspect into account. However, since it is impossible to precisely model
the real-world in a finite way, especially with its uncertain and continuous dynamics, then exploration of
all possibilities through approaches such as model-checking is infeasible [20]. This leads us to several
alternatives, such as using abstractions, verification via testing, and runtime monitoring. In the first case,
we may try to abstract from the complexity of the real world and provide a finite description of this
abstraction that we can then use in formal verification; this abstraction is very likely to be incorrect in
some way and will need subsequent refinement [21]. It is important to note that these abstractions of
a complex, continuous “real-world” will necessarily never be correct. A practical alternative is to use
sophisticated coverage-driven testing methods, appealing to Monte-Carlo techniques and dynamic test
refinement in order to systematically “verify” a wide range of practical situations. Such model-based
testing is a key technology but, as we move to more complex robot-human interactions, sophisticated
extensions may be required [22], [23]. Again, testing only provides a partial verification of the system
behaviour. In any realistic system, we cannot test all possible scenarios. Finally, while techniques such
as abstraction and testing are typically used before system deployment, it is also possible to verify the
system as it executes. There are a range of techniques capturing run-time verification, dynamic fault
monitoring, and compliance testing [24], [25] that provide mechanisms for assessing if the system has
strayed (or is straying) outside its requirements.
As we will see later, our approach is to apply formal verification to the components of the system that
we must be certain of (for example, the process of making decisions in unexpected situations) and carry
out testing for components whose behaviour is tightly dependent on the (unknown) environment (for
example, object recognition using reinforcement learning). Such “corroborative” verification, combining
a variety of techniques for distinct components, is increasingly used in robotic systems [?].
C. Self-Awareness
Work on self-awareness, from Philosophy, Psychology, AI, and Logic came together in the 1970s and
1980s, for example with “mental models” from Cognitive Psychology [26], Logic [27], and Computa-
tion [28], all helping start the field of ‘agents’. Similar activities occurred across Object-Based Systems in
Computer Science (reflection, meta-objects, etc) and Control Systems in Engineering (hierarchical control,
model-predictive control, etc). Since that time the field of agents, and multi-agent systems, has become
vast linking (through Control Systems) to Robotics and (through Objects) to Computation, as well as back
to Psychology and Philosophy. For example, robots with internal/self models are well established [29],
[30] computational introspection (including reflection, awareness, etc) is often used [31], [32], and even
hardware components may incorporate self-awareness [33]. A variation of this, specifically targeted at
networks, has come through the development of Autonomic Computing and then on to (so called) Self-*
systems, most obviously described as computational self-awareness. Lewis et al [34] state the key idea
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sufficiently quickly and effectively at run-time, nor consider and design for all possible actions of and
interactions between components at design time. Thus, in response, autonomic systems should instead
manage themselves at run-time according to high level objectives” [attributed to Kephart and Chess [35]]
In our overview of self-awareness from an agent point of view, we will revert to earlier work in
Psychology where the study of self-awareness and introspection (in a human context) is a strong and
persistent research field. Leading work by Duval and Wicklund [36] described how individuals could
assess not only what they are doing and experiencing, but why they are doing these things and whether
their goals are being achieved. Specifically, we might focus either on ourselves or on the environment in
which we are situated. In the former, we can assess
1. what we are thinking?
2. what motives do we have?
3. what we are doing (or at least trying to do)?
4. why choose this?
We can also go further and, through introspection, assess our own health and capabilities. So, added to
the above we might have
5. what affect this is having on the world?
6. how well we are achieving our goals?
7. how well are we functioning?
8. what current capabilities do we have?
In addition, as we live within a society that provides legal constraints and ethical norms, we also have
9. are we acting to legal standards
10. are we conforming with ethical/societal norms of behaviour?
There are many other psychological aspects that we are not concerned with here, for example emotions
such as happiness or stress. However, the above elements provide a strong set of requirements for
(human) self-awareness and introspection. These provide us with a framework to assess how we can
design (artificial) autonomous systems that allow us to implement and expose any, most, or all of the
above and, if so, how strongly can we verify these aspects in our system?
In this article, we provide an overview of how we can construct self-aware autonomous systems so as
to expose all the above elements. This will not only facilitate explicit self-awareness within the system,
but will provide the opportunity for strong, specifically formal, verification of these aspects. Combining
these elements together, we can potentially have verifiable, self-aware behaviour. In the next section, we
address the key aspect of our approach involving the architectural foundations of autonomous systems.
II. ARCHITECTURES
Architectures for autonomous systems, especially for those systems that have physical embodiment
such as vehicles or robots, require many different functions and functionalities. They need to sense
their environment and recognise objects, communicate with both other systems and people, move using
some form of propulsion mechanism, and act on their environment for example through grippers, drills,
loudspeakers, etc. In many complex autonomous systems it makes sense to have all of these aspects,
such as sensors, actuators, and communication as separate components in a modular architecture. The
predominant modular middleware, at least in academic endeavours, is provided by the Robot Operating
System (ROS) [37]. Each modular component, together with specific hardware (cameras, wheels, etc),
will incorporate software to control (or interpret) the activity of the hardware. Consequently, software
control systems are very widely used to manage and monitor individual hardware components. Each of
these (software controlled) components then forms part of an architectural scheme linking components
together and providing whole system behaviour.
A most obvious architectural approach is to have very limited modularity and to implement large and
complex monolithic control systems integrating multiple hardware devices. At this extreme we might, for
example, provide a complex (and deep) neural network to control all aspects of our system. While this
avoids problems with modularity, it increases the complexity significantly, especially when we require
explainability or verifiability. Such a monolithic approach is also difficult to engineer and maintain and so
a more structured architecture, in terms of hierarchical control is very popular. Here, a particular control
system ‘manages’ sub-systems, each with their own control algorithms. Each of the sub-systems might,
in turn manage further sub-systems. Such a hierarchical tree-like structure provides natural organisation
in terms of levels of abstraction, with the higher levels dealing with more abstract considerations, and
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approach is very popular within cyber-physical systems such as robots [38].
An alternative, but also hierarchical, approach uses symbolic AI techniques. For example a planning
node within such an architecture utilises a symbolic world model and invokes symbolic planning to
provide potential solutions. Being in symbolic form, often encoded via variations of formal logic, the
representations of world, plan outcomes, and plan options are amenable to deductive reasoning and
sophisticated analysis of various forms. While such approaches can benefit from analysis and reasoning,
the techniques used are generally much slower than sub-symbolic algorithms such as provided by neural
networks.
This leads on to an obvious compromise involving hybrid architectures. Developed within control
systems engineering, hybrid architectures provide a mixture of (continuous) feedback control nodes,
often at lower layers in a hierarchy, together with (discrete) nodes involving symbolic reasoning at higher
levels. The feedback control nodes are fast and provide rapid interaction and local optimisation, while the
discrete symbolic nodes manage activity across the the continuous nodes also providing discontinuous
changes in behaviour that are difficult to produce using hierarchies of continuous controllers. Such hybrid
architectures are efficient and flexible yet, in spite of the discrete nature of higher level nodes, are often
opaque in terms of exposing the reasons for their decisions, etc.
In our work, we go one step further and ensure that the high-level symbolic nodes are themselves
agents. An ‘agent’ is a key abstraction devised to capture the concept of “autonomous behaviour” [39],
and an agent will typically make its own decisions about what to do and when to do it. Importantly,
any high-level decision about what to do is encapsulated in the agent, corresponding to our earlier “fully
autonomous” categorisation. We take this yet further and insist that any high-level agent (and there is
often only one) in the architecture is a rational agent [40]. Alternatively termed as either an “intentional
agent” or “cognitive agent”, this is an agent that not only makes its own decisions but also
must have explicit reasons for making the choices it does, and should be able to explain these
if necessary.
These hybrid agent architectures provide flexibility and efficiency [41] whilst, as we will see later,
retaining explainability and verifiability [19]. The agents themselves are symbolic, typically programmed
in terms of so-called BDI principles [42], [43]: agents contain Beliefs about the state of the world
(and themselves), Desires representing their long-term goals, and Intentions capturing the goals that the
rational agent is committed to. As we will see later, these components are crucial in providing a range
of self-aware elements within the autonomous system.
It is useful to note that rational agents in these hybrid agent architectures collate information from their
sub-systems, representing them in terms of beliefs. Then based on current desires (long-term goals) and
beliefs, they deliberate and decide what activity to undertake, and finally invoke activity again within their
sub-systems. The agent is not driven solely by environmental interaction and can choose, for example
based on its own motivations, to undertake very different activities. In such a hybrid approach, the rational
agent is responsible for high-level autonomous (discrete) decisions, while traditional feedback control
systems are responsible for low-level (continuous) interactions:
Autonomous System
Rational
Agent
Continuous Control Discrete Decision-Making
Figure 2: Hybrid Agent-Architecture.
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range of feedback control modules, such as
• those integrating and assessing perceptions coming in to the system — for example, object recog-
nition, sensing, planning, language understanding, etc, and
• those invoking actuation or communication undertaken by the system — for example, motor control,
language generation, manipulation, etc.
Those modules dealing with perceptions process data/signals and provide symbolic knowledge to the
rational agent. The agent then makes high-level decisions given what is has received, combined with its
internal state and representation of context, and then sends actions/instructions to various control elements
that will invoke the actuation and communication. While there are some cases where there may be a
direct link from the perception elements to the actuation elements, for example in emergency situations
requiring immediate reaction, the general process is to locate all high-level decisions in the rational agent.
As indicated above, there will likely be very many feedback control components but typically only
one rational agent per autonomous system. For example, a “driverless” car will have feedback control
components for object recognition, learning, engine monitoring, etc, and will have further components
controlling motor speed, lane-following, braking, communication, etc. The agent will, based on input
received from the perception elements, make decisions about how to proceed and will then invoke various
actuation components. For example, whether it is safe to turn, what to do if something unexpected
happens, etc.
As we will see later, a key aspect of self-awareness is for the agent to be aware of the control modules
within the architecture and to have a (hopefully reasonably accurate) view of the capabilities and reliability
of each. For example if some sensor fusion module regularly produces incorrect results, the agent can
take this reliability in to account when making decisions (especially critical decisions) when this node
provides it with some input.
Example: Consider an unmanned air system, or ‘drone’, that is fully autonomous. There will be a
variety of continuous control sub-systems such as those involved in object recognition, communication
to authorities, fault detection, navigation, autopilot, etc. In very specific emergency cases, such as
an imminent collision, we might have direct linkage between these sub-systems. For example within
something like an Airborne Collision Avoidance System, object recognition might be connected directly
to the autopilot. In general flight, however, the sensing/detection components pass information (such as
“air vehicle detected at 2km distance, bearing 90◦”) to the agent. The agent then uses this, combined
with its mission goals, safety requirements, etc, to decide what to do next. The “what to do next” will
rarely be detailed, low-level controls but will typically be new destination instructions to the autopilot
or an intention to keep monitoring the other air vehicle’s position. In such a way, the agent provides
separation of the high-level decisions, from the low-level signals, reaction, and manipulation.
Work on architectures particularly for self-aware or autonomic systems are, as we might expect, derived
from work on agent architectures. These were often, in turn, derived from psychological or philosophical
interpretations of human decision-making. Consequently, change in high-level goals in computational
systems can often be seen as analogous to (interpretations of) humans “changing their mind”. This
work has led on to the development of a particular branch of “computationally self-aware” systems. For
example, the collection [34] describes the work from a large EU project tackling self-aware systems,
bringing together strands from multi-agent systems, autonomy, Philosophy, predictive control, planning,
etc. The collection develops the notion of computational self-awareness, a development of introspective
agents, but is particularly targeted at networks, as it says it “focusses on architectures and techniques
for designing self-aware computing systems at the node and network levels”. As well as this traditional
system focus, the techniques utilised are almost exclusively based on learning, typically online learning,
reinforcement learning, and adaptivity in general. It is notable that, in this work, the route from Psychology
and Philosophy through to computation follows a very similar path to that of agents and multi-agent
systems and, to a lesser extent, general AI before that. While much of such work is focussed on
learning, models built through learning, and adaptivity, reference is made to formal models (though
limited to continuous envelopes), to higher-level discrete concepts such as ‘knowledge’ (though limited
to ontologies), and to the self-models widespread across a range of disciplines. All of these aspects are
relevant to us. However, as highlighted in the foreword to [34] “there is still a lack of formal frameworks
for rigorously about the behaviour of such systems”.
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We will now go through a range of the self-awareness attributes expected of humans (as described
earlier) and assess how well we can capture these within autonomous systems built using the above
hybrid agent approach. Several of the attributes or concepts will merge once we consider artificial, rather
than human, systems but it is instructive to explore how (and if at all) artificial autonomous systems can
provide what we might consider to be self-awareness.
Recall that the computational elements we are concerned with are typically termed rational (alter-
natively, intentional or cognitive) agents [42], [44], [45]. The core aspect here are that, as they are
autonomous, these agents should have some ‘motivation’ for acting in the way that they do. An agent
is rational in the sense that the decisions it makes, often in unpredictable environments, should be both
‘reasonable’ and ‘justifiable’.
A. What is it ‘thinking’?
Can we expose the “reasoning” of the agent/system to show what options there are, where we are in
the execution, and what agent is trying to do? In relation to human self-awareness this corresponds to
asking:
1. what we are thinking?
2. what motives do we have?
3. what we are doing (or at least trying to do)?
Rao and Georgeff [43] developed a specific agent framework where agents comprise the “mental attitudes”
of Beliefs, Desires and Intentions (BDI) that are used to describe, respectively, the informational, moti-
vational, and deliberative states of the agent, and together effectively determine the high-level behaviour.
Rational agents, particularly BDI agents have a “reasoning cycle” that captures the stages of reasoning that
the agent will go through. The particular agent programming language we have developed and deployed,
Gwendolen [46], [47], exhibits a reasoning cycle typical of many BDI languages:
1) Get external perceptions/messages — extract all the new information received, either from the
environment or from other agents
2) Generate possible intentions — from the new inputs, combined with existing intentions, a new
set of possible intentions is generated representing events (new beliefs) the agent needs to handle,
goals the agent wants to achieve and (where an intention has an associated plan) the steps that the
agent has chosen for pursuing the intention.
3) Select an intention — choose one from this set
4) Where there is no associated plan for handling the intention’s event or achieving its goal, generate
plans for that intention and select one of these plans and associate it with the intention.
5) Execute the next step in the plan for the selected intention.
6) Go back to (1)
If, in (3) no intentions are available then the agent goes back to (1) to check its environment for updated
perceptions and new messages, both of which may then generate new intentions.
In (3) there is an application specific function that selects one intention out of a set of intentions. By
default, intentions are maintained in a FIFO (first in, first out) queue and selected in that order.
Step (4) involves inspecting a plan library and finding plans that match the current intention. These check
both the event (belief or goal) the intention needs to handle and that some plan specific context (a logical
expression over the agent’s beliefs and goals) holds. As with intentions, application specific functions
for selecting a plan from the set can be created but, by default, plans are selected in an order specified
by the programmer. Plans specify a sequence of steps to be taken which can include adding or removing
beliefs and goals and performing actions such as sending instructions to other parts of the autonomous
system.
In this sense the options and motivations are symbolically represented and so can be used in expla-
nations of what the agent (and, hence, system) is trying to do (see Section VI-A). So, corresponding to
human self-awareness, we can see agent/system self-awareness as follows.
1. what is it ‘thinking’? −→ where are we in the agent’s reasoning cycle (steps (1) to (6))?
2. what motives do we have? −→ what are the agent’s current goals/desires?
3. what we are doing (or at least trying to do)? −→ what is the agent’s currently selected intention?
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As well as exposing the state of internal intentions, it is important to expose deliberative aspects, in
particular the reasons for taking certain decisions. Why is one particular course of action chosen rather
than another? What options are there, what reasons/motivations were used for selection, and what options
were not chosen (and why)? Again, relating back to human self-awareness, we might ask:
2. what motives do we have? −→ what are the agent’s current goals/desires?
3. what we are doing (or at least trying to do)? −→ what is the agent’s currently selected intention?
4. why choose this? −→ why was this intention/plan/action selected?
As in the the previous section we can expose (and explain, if necessary) exactly what ‘motives’ (i.e.
goals/intentions) the agent/system has, and so what it is ‘trying’ to do. Now we can also expose the plan
selection mechanism (potentially also intention selection) in order to capture the reasons for choosing
one plan to achieve some goal/intention, rather than another.
Abstractly, we might have a simple goal to go_to_shop and have two possible plans
• go_to_shop by vehicle
• go_to_shop by walking
Without any further beliefs/motivations we might choose arbitrarily between these. But if we now add a
goal/motivation to get to the shop quickly then when we come to this choice again we will select the first
option (assuming the vehicle is quicker than walking). On the other hand, if the agent has a belief that
vehicle_out_of_fuel is true then the selection would favour the second plan. In all these cases,
the reasons for choosing one plan over another is explicit and symbolically represented.
Example: Consider a robot deployed in a search and rescue situation. It might have a number of roles
including map_area and clear_area. The robot might well be part of some ad hoc team of robots
formed rapidly on the fly and its role (mapping or clearing) will have been assigned during team formation
and transformed into a goal. We will represent a plan in the general form
Event: Context <- Action
were Event is the event associated with the current intention (i.e., the addition or removal of a belief or
goal), Context is the plan specific context that needs to hold for the plan to be applicable and Action
is an action to be taken if the plan applies. We will use B p to indicate that some predicate p is a belief
of the agent and G q to indicate that some predicate q is a goal of the agent.
In our example the robot therefore has two plans for what to do when it enters a location that contains
rubble.
1) B contains_rubble(Location): G map_area
<- send_message(contains_rubble(Location))
Here, the recognition that a particular belief has become true (B contains_rubble(Location))
acts as a trigger for the behaviour. However, there is a context requirement (or guard) that acts as a
filter on triggered behaviour (G map_area). Then, if the trigger occurs and the guard is satisfied,
the body of the plan can be invoked (send_message(contains_rubble(Location)).
Consequently, the intuitive representation of the above is
If you believe the current location contains rubble and your goal is to map the area then send
a message to the rest of the team informing them of the location of the rubble.
2) B contains_rubble(Location): G clear_area <- collect_rubble
This second plan corresponds to
If you believe the current location contains rubble and your goal is to clear the area then
collect the rubble.
To extend the example the robot might also have a plan for how to react if it receives an urgent request
for help (e.g., from a trapped person). In a situation where it both receives a call for help and perceives
some rubble then its intention selection mechanism can potentially prioritise handling the call for help.
In summary, in choosing what to do and how to do it, the agent will use its particular intention
selection [48], [49] and plan selection [50], [51] mechanisms, both of which can be exposed to scrutiny.
C. What can it do?
Systems take actions that impact on the real world. If we are to use a rational agent to reason about
these actions and their effects, then we typically need to model these actions as capabilities. Essentially,
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capabilities simply extend actions with pre-conditions describing the state of the world in which the
action will be invoked and post-conditions describing the (expected) change in the world affected by the
action. These pre- and post-conditions are typically represented in symbolic logic, allowing the agent to
reason about when the actions can be used and what outcomes from them might be expected.
A capability can thus only be executed when its pre-conditions are satisfied, and its post-conditions
will be satisfied if the action/capability succeeds. This form of capability/action theory is widely used
in planning systems as well as agent programming, and corresponds with classical STRIPS [52] or
primitive operations [53], while BDI programming languages that explicitly deal with capabilities include
3APL [54] and GOAL [55]. Once we have such capabilities, the questions
5. what affect is this having on the world?
6. how well we are achieving our goals?
8. what current capabilities do we have?
become clearer. Certainly, the answer to (8) is clearly linked to the set of viable capabilities the agent
has. The answer to (5) is potentially more complex and can involve combining a tree of capabilities so
that the post-conditions of all these combined actions/capabilities describe all the possible ways in which
the system can ‘impact ’ the real-world. Answering (6) requires the agent to monitor its progress towards
its goals.
The inclusion of a perception step in the reasoning cycle of most BDI agents allows them to monitor
the effect of their actions on the world. At its simplest, the concept of an achievement goal used in many
BDI languages enables agents to continue attempting some action until some desired state of the world
is achieved. For instance an agent could have a goal to clear an area of rubble and a simple plan:
G clear_area: {} <- select_and_remove_debris
Interpreted as: If your goal is to clear the area select and remove one piece of debris. Note that this plan
has an empty context, {}, and so is always applicable if the agent still has a goal to clear the area.
This plan will continue executing until the goal is achieved (i.e clear_area is achieved), so the
agent will continue selecting and removing pieces of debris until no more remain. More sophisticated
plans could track progress towards achievement of the goal, for instance checking in the plan context that
the amount of rubble in the area was reducing. If the amount of rubble was not reducing then the system
could conclude that something was wrong with the debris removal capabilities and take appropriate action.
In principle, we can go beyond the straightforward modelling of actions and capabilities and bring in
much stronger mechanisms to predict future behaviour. There are many works related to this area, such
as in Control Engineering through aspects such as predictive control, but we just mention one stream
of work that is very relevant to our model. This is work by Winfield and colleagues incorporating self-
simulations within an autonomous system, particularly a robot. Inspired by the artificial theory of mind,
this work provides (mobile) robots with simulation-based internal models that the robot can use for the
prediction of outcomes. Thus, at significant moments the robot can simulate/predict what might happen
if it chooses various actions, and then can assess the outcomes. This has been shown to be very useful in
predicting both safe [56] and ethical [57] behaviour. Furthermore, this approach coincides with our work
here when we consider the verification of ethical autonomy in [58] and later in Section V-B. Finally,
while this self-simulation approach is very appealing it is also very costly since predicting all possibilities
at every execution step is infeasible. However, just as we humans do, this approach need only be used
at critical or important decision points, thus potentially limiting the overall cost.
D. How well is it working?
This ability to monitor the affect an agent is having on the world and, in particular, to reason about
success and failure naturally leads us to consider the question:
7. how well are we functioning?
and to a more refined view on
8. what current capabilities do we have?
The representation of capabilities in an explicit way has a practical benefit. Representing capabili-
ties in terms of pre- and post-conditions allows us to compare the actual effect an action has in the
world with its expected effect. For instance, in [59], we advocate representing capabilities as a tuple
〈C,Pre, Post, φs, φf , φa〉, where C is an identifier for the capability, Pre and Post are pre- and
post-conditions, and φs, φf and φa are logical conditions for when the capability has “completed and
succeeded”, “completed and failed”, or is “ongoing but in need of an abort”.
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Conditions such as φs etc. can be inferred from the agent’s belief base and so checked after the
perception stage has occurred. This allows the agent to monitor the effect of the action on the environment
and react as appropriate. Action monitoring and failure for BDI agents is an area of ongoing research.
If some capability is malfunctioning, for example due to failure of a software or hardware component,
then it may be necessary to adapt the plans that use that capability. We might need to replace either the
whole plan, or components within it, by alternative actions/capabilities. It is here that the awareness of
the agent concerning what it is trying to do and what capabilities it has, provides benefits. The agent can
reason about how to replace some plan elements by carrying out symbolic reasoning in order to assess
whether the modified plan will achieve less, more, the same, or just different outcomes. Further work
along these lines, involving a rational agent reasoning about its explicit capabilities, is given in [60]. As
a simple example of capability representations, the move action of an autonomous vehicle is represented
in [60] as
C = {at(X), not (X = Y )}move(X,Y ) {not at(X), at(Y )}
where X is the current position of the vehicle and Y is the destination. The above capability, C,
incorporates a pre-condition that the vehicle must be at(X) and a post-condition that (upon successful
completion) the vehicle will be at(Y ). We assume that this simple move capability works by calculating
a plan of way-points to the desired location, Y , and then calculating the necessary wheel rotations to
navigate between the way-points.
Now suppose we have a plan to perform some task (for instance some kind of inspection task) at a
specific location. So we might have a plan:
B daily_inspection_time: B current_location(X)
<- move(X, inspection_point); inspect
When it is the daily inspection time, move from the current location to the inspection point and
perform the inspection.
If something has gone wrong with one of the motors or wheels on the robot then the calculations needed
to navigate between way-points in move(X, inspection_point) may no longer be accurate (for
instance its movement calculations may always result in the robot slightly missing its target location)
and this plan would start failing. An alternative movement strategy might be to use a feedback controller
to fix on the desired final location and move there by orienting in that direction and then activating the
motors to keep the robot always pointing the same way and moving forwards. This could be represented
by the capability
C1 = {at(X), not (X = Y )} feedback(Y ) {not at(X), at(Y )}
It is easy to see that the new action feedback(Y ), invoking a particular feedback controller, should be
substitutable for move(X,Y ) in the inspection plan.
Potentially it would also be possible to learn new post-conditions for move(X,Y ) utilising work on
the learning of action descriptions from the domain of AI planning [61], [62].
IV. FORMAL VERIFICATION OF RATIONAL AGENTS
Formal verification is essentially the process of assessing whether a precise specification, usually given
in a formal logic, is satisfied on the system in question. For a property, A, given in the relevant logic there
may be many different approaches to formal verification [63]–[65], from deductive verification against a
logical description of the system S (i.e., a proof that S implies A) to the algorithmic verification of the
property against a formal model of the system, MS (i.e., MS |= A, meaning that A is true of all possible
routes through MS). This algorithmic approach has been very successful in both academia and industry,
principally via the technique of model checking [16]. This takes a precise, mathematical model of the
system in question, defining all the system’s possible executions, and then checks the required logical
property against this model (and, hence, against all possible executions).
While model checking involves assessing a logical formula against all executions of a model of the
system, an alternative approach is to check a logical formula directly against all actual executions of the
system. This progam model checking approach [66] depends centrally on being able to determine all true
executions of the actual program. With languages such as Java, this is feasible since virtual machines
are available that can be used to extract all program executions. Specifically, the Java Pathfinder (JPF)
system carries out formal verification of Java programs following this approach by assessing all possible
execution paths through the Java program [66]. While sometimes slower than traditional model-checking,
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this approach avoids the need for an additional level of modelling (and therefore, justification) and ensures
that the verification results directly apply to the real code.
In examples discussed later, we utilise the MCAPL framework, which includes a model-checker for
our agent programs built on top of JPF. As the MCAPL framework is described in detail in [67], we only
provide a brief overview here. MCAPL has two main sub-components: the AIL-toolkit for implementing
interpreters for belief-desire-intention (BDI) agent programming languages; and the AJPF model checker
for verifying programs in those languages.
Interpreters for BDI programming languages are programmed by instantiating the Java-based AIL
toolkit [68]. Essentially, an agent system can be programmed in the normal way for the programming
language but then any program must run within the AIL interpreter, which in turn runs on top of the
Java Pathfinder (JPF) virtual machine.
Agent JPF (AJPF) is a customisation of JPF that is specifically optimised for AIL-based language
interpreters. Agents programmed in languages that are implemented using the AIL-toolkit can thus be
formally verified via AJPF. The Gwendolen language we use throughout this article is just such a language
and so AJPF provides a formal verification route for our rational agents. Furthermore, if agents run within
an environment programmed in Java, then the whole agent-environment system can be model checked.
Here, symbolic execution of the code is used to generate all executions, while the modified virtual
machine allows backtracking over various executions generated.
Common to all language interpreters implemented using the AIL are the AIL-agent data structures for
beliefs, intentions, goals, etc., which are subsequently accessed by the model checker and on which the
logical modalities of a property specification language are defined.
Finally, in our case the base formal logic used is a temporal logic of belief, intention, and action.
This combines standard (linear-time) operators such as as ‘’, meaning “always in the future” and ‘♦’,
meaning “at some point in the future”, with operators capture the beliefs, intentions, or actions of various
agents. For example, we use the formulae such as Bxdaytime to represent the statement that agent x
believes it is daytime. Again, we will not provide detailed description here but point towards papers such
as [67], [69].‘
V. VERIFICATION AND SELF-AWARENESS
The ability to formally verify an agent’s behaviour and decision-making can lead us towards a range
of additional questions concerning self-awareness and autonomous systems. We begin with a necessary
step before any autonomous system can be deployed in practical scenarios.
A. Is it legal?
Once we can expose the high-level system decisions, we can match these against a range of ‘expected’
behaviours. In particular, we can match against legal requirements we might have. This comparison can
be made before system deployment but, as the system is aware of its own decision-making, it can in
principle carry out this analysis as it executes. While this may involve quite complex, and resource
intensive, verification to be carried out it does provide increased flexibility in that the system is able to
match its decision-making against new, previously unseen, legal expectations. In order to show how we
might answer the question
9. are we acting to legal standards
we will consider one exemplar from the field of unmanned air systems. This work, from [70], [71] and
particularly [72], shows how we might formally verify that an agent controlling an unmanned air system
makes the same (high-level) decisions that a human pilot would (or at least should). The basic idea is
that there are rules describing what a human pilot should do when in control of an air vehicle and, once
we are replacing human control by a software agent, then the agent must at least abide by the same rules
the human pilot should. Note that this does not concern low-level flying skills — the aircraft’s autopilot
will take care of those — but addresses the high-level decision-making involved in issues such as what
to do in traffic, what to do if there are problems, what to do with air traffic control instructions, etc.
Specifically, in [72] the “Rules of the Air” [73], are considered. Written for human pilots, these provide
the required (legal) behaviour of the pilot responsible for the air vehicle. Any prospective human pilot is
examined against these rules and so we at least wish to know that if we replace the pilot with a software
agent, the agent will also adhere to the rules. In order to be truly confident in the autonomous system,
the agent must at least be verified against all the “Rules of the Air”, no doubt with additional legal
requirements. We will not consider these extra aspects, but just show how some of the “Rules of the Air”
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can be formalised and then formally verified on the rational agent controlling a relevant air vehicle1 A
typical rule (from the “Rules of the Air”) that we expect a human pilot to obey is
when two aircraft are approaching head-on ... and there is danger of a collision, each shall
alter its course to the right. [73]
We would expect a trained pilot to adhere to this; once we have an autonomous system, it is our rational
agent that is responsible for this.
As we wish to formally verify that the agent conforms to this ‘legal’ behaviour, we need several
elements
1) the agent that is controlling the unmanned air vehicle, and
2) a formal description of the precise requirement, for example of the rule above.
The basic agent implemented in [72] is a Gwendolen agent comprising 36 plans capturing the different
phases of the air mission, such as taxiing to the runway, interacting with air traffic control, taking off,
following a particular route at selected altitude, emergency avoid, landing approach, landing, taxiing to
parking position, etc. The agent’s plans interact with a range of subsystems, some providing input (such
as sensors) others providing capabilities (such as directional change). As with other uses of agents in
autonomous systems, the agent’s beliefs are formed from sensor readings. In principle, a BDI agent
controlling the air vehicle might have some/all of the following.
Beliefs, for example concerning
• being at the runway
• turning right (e.g. during sense & avoid)
.....
Desires, for example concerning
• completing its mission
• avoiding collisions and near-misses
.....
and Intentions, for example concerning
• taxiing to runway
• turning right to avoid object approaching head-on
.....
In addition to the agent, with its plans, beliefs, and decision-making, we also need a formal description
of the rules to be checked. There are very many of these in the “Rules of the Air”, with many being
ambiguous or imprecise (after all they are intended for human pilots) meaning that formalisation can be
quite difficult. However, for illustration, we just choose a relatively simple detect and avoid requirement,
as described above:
“When two aircraft are approaching head-on, or approximately so, in the air and there is a
danger of collision, each shall alter its course to the right.”
This rule might be formalised in our temporal logic of belief and intention as
(Badetected_aircraft⇒ ♦Baengage(emergency_avoid))
ensuring that emergency_avoid will be engaged. It is separate question, often delegated to non-formal
verification techniques, of how effective emergency_avoid is in ensuring the aircraft turns to the right, but
the expected decision is nevertheless captured by the above. (There are many more rules, and formulae
derived from the rules, that complete this formalisation — we will not describe them all here, but see [72]
for details.)
Now that we have a suitable Gwendolen agent that can control, at a high-level, the autonomous air
vehicle together with formalisations of the legal requirements captured in the “Rules of the Air”, we can
carry our formal verification using AJPF as described elsewhere. Verifying the above rule is relatively
simple, but increasingly complex rules together with a more sophisticated agent, will lead to complex
and time-consuming verification.
If such a verification is carried out before a mission, then we are likely to be unconcerned with the
speed of verification. In such a case, we know that the unmanned air vehicle will conform to the legal
requirements captured in the “Rules of the Air”. The agent is aware of its own decision-making and of
the rules against which it has been verified. If the air vehicle moves to a different jurisdiction then as
long as the agent has behaviour previously verified to conform to this new context, it can utilise these. If,
1In [72], the air vehicle in question is a simulated one, flying in a realistic but simulated air environment.
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however, it comes across a new set of regulations/rules that it has not seen before, what should it do? Most
likely ‘stop’, if it can. However, in the future we might foresee a situation where the regulations/rules for
certain airspaces are available as formal (in our sense) requirements. Then there is the possibility that the
agent might invoke formal verification techniques to assess its own plans/behaviour against these new
rules, identifying and explaining where mismatches occur. This, of course, would require much more
efficient formal verification techniques [74].
Finally, while we have concentrated on the rational agent part of the architecture, an unmanned air
system comprises very many lower-level feedback control and sub-symbolic systems. These range across
autopilot functions, visual recognition, stability management, navigation, system health monitoring, etc.
B. Is it ethical?
While conforming to legal requirements may be sufficient for many autonomous systems, a further
question, particularly for systems deployed in domestic settings is:
10. are we conforming with ethical/societal norms of behaviour?
In [75], Cointe et al. integrate BDI agents and ethical reasoning into a comprehensive framework in which
agent reasoning determines sets of desirable, feasible and moral actions/plans and then uses context-
sensitive ethical principles to select one action from these sets. Desirable actions are those which will
advance the agent’s goals (as in the kinds of reasoning we have already discussed here), feasible actions
are those which can be performed, and moral actions are those which conform to societal norms. At the
intention/plan selection phase the agent can then consider these sets, selecting from their intersection (if
such exists) or using mechanisms based on some ethical theory to select them.
In [58] we explore this idea further. We implemented BDI style reasoning in Python and used Asimov’s
Laws of Robotics as a simple (and well known) example of an ethical theory that could be used to
decide courses of action. In experiments a robot had a goal to move to a particular location, but through
monitoring of its environment it became aware that a “human” (also represented by a robot) was moving
towards a dangerous area. The robot could continue moving to its desired location (as ordered) or choose
to intercept the human (and potentially in some situations could do both). Where the goal-based reasoning
did not produce an ethically acceptable outcome (i.e., where harm befell the human) the moral decision-
making could override the default choices and would select the option for intercepting the human.
In performing this reasoning the Python implementation used three comparison functions for its options:
task1 ≺hd task2 – meaning task2 places a human in more danger (hd) than task1;
task1 ≺ro task2 – meaning task2 places the robot further away from its ordered location (ro) than
task1; and
task1 ≺rd task2 – meaning task2 places the robot in more danger than task1 (rd).
In the case where two options, task1 and task2, are available we were able to verify that our imple-
mentation of Asimov’s laws were correct by verifying the properties:
((Ba(current_plan(task1))→ ¬P(task1 ≺hd task2) (1)
((Ba(current_plan(task1)) ∧P(task2 ≺ro task1)→ P(task1 ≺hd task2) (2)
((Ba(current_plan(task1)) ∧P(task2 ≺hd task1)→
P(task1 ≺ro task2) ∨P(task1 ≺rd task2) (3)
The three properties state that:
1) it is always the case that if task1 is believed to be the current task then Python has calculated that
task1 either does not place the human in significant danger or, if it does, then task2 places the
human in greater danger (property (1) – corresponding to Asimov’s first law);
2) it is always the case that if task1 is believed to be the current task and Python calculates that
it places the robot further away from its (human specified) objective than task2 then Python has
calculated that task2 places the human in more danger than task1 (property (2) – corresponding
to Asimov’s second law); and lastly
3) that if task1 is believed to be the current task and Python calculates that it places the robot in more
danger than task2 then either task2 places the robot much further from its objective than task1
or it results in the human being in much closer to danger than task1 (property (3) – corresponding
to Asimov’s third law).
Similar properties can be constructed to compare groups of multiple tasks, etc.
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Fundamental to this work was both the self-awareness involved in monitoring the robot’s environment
and predicting the outcomes of its actions, and the explicit internal representation of Asimov’s laws that
allowed it to pick the most ethically acceptable option.
We have also investigated the use of other theories to allow BDI agents to reason about the ethical
acceptability of their actions. In [76] we considered a situation where ethical reasoning is only invoked
when none of the systems existing plans apply, or a plan is being applied but is not achieving the robot’s
goal – this follows from the agent having some self-awareness of the effectiveness of its actions and the
options it has available. In this situation we considered an architecture where a route planning system
is invoked to produce a wider range of options and they are annotated with the ethical consequences of
selecting that option. We considered examples from the domain of unmanned air systems and an ethical
theory based on prima facie duties in which the system has a preference order over its ethical duties
(e.g., its duty to minimize casualties takes precedence over its duty to obey the laws of the air). In this
system we were able to prove not only properties such as those in the Python based system (i.e., that
the implementation correctly captured the ethical theory) but also “sanity checking” properties – so, for
instance, in specific scenarios we could verify that the aircraft, if forced into an emergency landing,
would always land in a field rather than on a road.
Clearly, this just “scratches the surface” of the realm of machine ethics. There is much work in
Philosophy, AI, and robotics concerning all these aspects. However, the above shows, at least for some
simple ethical views, that the combination of self-awareness (“what decisions are made, and why”) and
formal verification (“are all decisions made in the right way”) gives us a mechanisms for exploring
verifiable robot/machine ethics.
C. Awareness of acceptable boundaries
In order to formally verify the agents controlling our autonomous systems we have to supply them
with all sequences of all possible incoming perception predicates. In systems of any complexity this
rapidly becomes impractical and we are forced to make some assumptions about the behaviour of the
environment in order to control the state space exploration of the verification technique (in our case,
model-checking).
Consider, for example an intelligent cruise control agent in an autonomous vehicle, that can perceive the
environmental predicates safe, meaning that it is safe for the vehicle to accelerate, at_speed_limit,
meaning that the vehicle reached its speed limit, driver_brakes and driver_accelerates,
meaning that the driver is braking or accelerating.
The state space explosion problem, occurring when all executions need to be explored, can be addressed
by making assumptions about the environment. For instance, we might assume that a car cannot both brake
and accelerate at the same time: subsets of environmental predicates containing both driver_brakes
and driver_accelerates therefore need not be supplied to the agent during model-checking, as they
do not correspond to situations that we believe likely (or even possible) in the actual environment. This
structured abstraction of the world is grounded in assumptions that help prune the possible perceptions
and hence control state space explosion.
However, these structured abstractions can be a problem if their assumptions are incorrect. Let us
suppose that the cruise control system crashes if the driver is accelerating and braking at the same
time. If the subsets of environmental predicates generated to formally verify it never contains both
driver_brakes and driver_accelerates, then the static formal verification succeeds but if one
real driver, for whatever reason, operates both the acceleration and brake pedals at the same time, the
real system crashes!
In [77], [78] we investigated the use of Runtime Verification in order to monitor whether the system
was operating within the bounds where it had been verified. In particular we generate both the structured
abstraction used in model-checking and a runtime monitor from the same specification (in a formalism
known as trace expressions [79]). The runtime monitor is used by the agent to observe the perceptions
coming into the system and check they fall within the bounds of the structured abstraction, if they do
not then the agent can employ fail-safe procedures having recognised it is now operating outside its
guaranteed safe envelope.
VI. EXPLAINABILITY
While verification is an important part of the development process of any safety-critical system,
autonomous systems face an additional barrier to public acceptance, namely that their behaviour can
often seem mysterious. Thus it is widely recognised that autonomous systems need to be explainable and
self-aware, and agent-based approaches such as we have been discussing here, can help with this.
16
A. Can it explain itself?
Once we have the exposure of mental states such as beliefs and desires, possibilities and choices, we
are able to modify the agent/system to explain itself in more understandable natural language. In [80], we
carry out such an extension, providing human-level explanations for the decisions taken. This effectively
provides a “why did you do that?” button which allows a user to interrogate a robot about its actions.
Given the symbolic nature of the agent underlying the autonomous system, this involves utilising
previous work on debugging cognitive agent programs and extending it to generate explanations from
logs of key events in the program execution. These logs were represented as a sequence of numbered
states.
In order to make the answers to why-questions comprehensible to end users, events must be abstracted
from application-specific predicates. Dictionaries are employed in order to translate the first-order logic
presentation of concepts within the agent program in natural language.
Typical sample output, from [80] is provided below
drop was executed because Plan 1: in response to the event: added the goal
achieve rubble(2,2) do add the goal achieve “the robot is holding
rubble” THEN move_to(2,2) THEN drop was selected in state 13 because the event
added the goal achieve rubble(2,2) was posted in state 9
This is in contrast to autonomous systems built using more opaque, sub-symbolic AI, where explainability
is much more challenging. In our approach, however, the fact that we already have explicit representations
of beliefs, goals, selections and actions, provides a strong basis for a range of explainability options.
Furthermore, the combination of in-built self simulation (as outlined in Section III-C) together with
the notion of explainability allows us to move beyond answering just “why did you do that” questions
and on to “what will you do next, and why” questions.
B. Winfield and Jirotka’s “Ethical Black Box”
In addition to being able to explain its behaviour directly to users/clients, it will be important to provide
a clear and precise record of its behaviour, not least for subsequent accident investigation or legal action.
Winfield and Jirotka [81] suggest a mechanism analogous to the “flight data recorder” mandated for all
passenger aircraft but now for robots and designed to record all the decisions made, options available,
environmental context, etc. Once we are able to ensure that any robot can explain its decisions and
options to humans, as in the previous section, then we simply do this at every (or at least every crucial)
step but record the explanation in a log rather than (or possibly as well as) conveying it to the humans
involved.
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this article we have described a broad theme of work centred on agent-based architectures for
autonomous systems. With the right type of agent, specifically a rational agent [40], this not only provides
strong self-awareness capabilities but allows for strong (and formal) verification [19]. And, from a system
point of view, separating out low-level control and high-level decision-making in this way allows diverse
verification techniques to be used and integrated [82].
The approach provides a range of self-awareness capabilities and capture a diverse range of aspects,
from ethics [58] or self-certification [83] to self-reconfigurability [60] and explainability [80]. In addition
to providing a range of capabilities, this approach is being applied to a range of practical autonomous
systems, such as satellites [69], [84], unmanned air systems [70], [72], and road vehicle convoys [85]–[87].
Finally, in cases where a distinct agent is not available within the autonomous system’s architecture,
we might instead add a governor agent to the system to monitor and regulate actions/decisions the system
makes [88], [89]. Here we can again use our agent verification techniques, but this time to prove that
the governor agent always regulate the safety/ethics of decisions correctly [58].
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